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IN THE 21ST CENTURY



THE ROAD AHEAD

March 2002

NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY— THE ROAD AHEAD

Our nations established NATO to provide security for the free peoples of Europe and North America; to build a grand alliance of freedom to defend values, which were won at great cost. We've succeeded, in part.

The NATO alliance deterred the Soviet Union. It provided the time and space for free peoples to defeat communism. And it

brought the Cold War to a bloodless end. Now, we have a great opportunity to build a Europe whole, free and at peace, with this grand alliance of liberty at its very core.

That work has begun. By bringing in new members, we extend the security and stability through central Europe. By establishing the partnership for peace, we reached out across central and eastern Europe and Eurasia. By our actions in the Balkans, we halted ethnic cleansing in the heart of Europe and halted a dictator in the process.

Yet, there is more to do. We must strengthen our alliance, modernize our forces and prepare for new threats. We must expand cooperation with our partners, including Russia and the Ukraine. And we must extend our hands and open our hearts to new members, to build security for all of Europe.

We meet in the ancient capital of a new democracy, our ally. Prague will host our next summit in November... In preparation for that meeting, we must affirm our enduring commitments by preparing for the challenges of our time.

George W. Bush

President of the United States of America



President Bush and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the White House

Editor's Note: This 21st issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* explores major themes facing the 19-member North Atlantic Alliance, including consideration of its expansion and transformation, through a series of articles and reference materials from experts within the United States Government and from the academic and private sectors.

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21ST CENTURY NATO: NEW CAPABILITIES, NEW MEMBERS, NEW RELATIONSHIPS

By Marc Grossman

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs



“The future of NATO has been debated before and we have always come back to the fundamentals: values matter. Collective defense matters. Capabilities matter. The transatlantic relationship matters. And because NATO has always adapted to meet new challenges, NATO matters,” says Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman. This article was adapted from testimony he presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee February 28th.

Our governments, our parliaments and our publics ought to talk about the future of NATO. That is what democratically supported foreign and defense policy is all about. The future of NATO has been debated before and we have always come back to the fundamentals: values matter. Collective defense matters. Capabilities matter. The transatlantic relationship matters. And because NATO has always adapted to meet new challenges, NATO matters.

Step back with me for just a moment and realize how far we have come. Think about these three quotations:

First, Winston Churchill, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere.”

Second, President Vaclav Havel, in Prague on July 1, 1991: “Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw Pact, became the city where the Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the Cold War.”

Third, President George Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001: “All of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have

the same chance for security and freedom — and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe — as Europe’s old democracies have.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a fundamental pillar of our foreign and defense policy. As President Bush’s speech in Warsaw shows (and it is worth reading again as we enter into the critical months before the Prague Summit), we want NATO to succeed. The Alliance must be an effective tool in the world after September 11.

NATO is not less important after September 11, it is more important.

The attacks of September 11 and NATO’s rapid and steadfast response prove NATO’s continuing value. Invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history, NATO sent a clear message that the Alliance is united and determined to defeat terrorism.

We greatly value NATO’s collective response, as well as the contributions of individual allies to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft have logged over 2,600 hours patrolling the skies above American cities, and NATO ships patrol the Eastern Mediterranean. All NATO Allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refueling assistance, and stepped up intelligence efforts.

Fifty years of cooperation through NATO made natural the participation of Allied and Partner forces in Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. Allied and Partner contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom include extensive air reconnaissance, refueling, cargo, and close air support missions; an array of special forces missions; specialized nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons units; mine clearing units; medical units; and an array of allied ships on patrol. Almost all of the contributors to the International Security Assistance Force, currently led by Britain and, we hope, to be followed by Turkey, are either current allies, potential future allies, or NATO Partner countries who have been training and exercising with NATO in the Partnership for Peace. Altogether these allies and Partners have deployed nearly 4,000 troops to Afghanistan.

September 11 has brought home to us all that we face new threats and new challenges. That is why NATO ministers at their meeting in Brussels last December agreed to intensify common efforts to meet the threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that all allies face. When President Bush meets with allied leaders in Prague later this year, we expect that allies will be ready to approve a program of action to enhance NATO's ability to deal with these and other threats.

I am confident that NATO will respond to these challenges, just as it has responded to every challenge that has come its way. I say this because, contrary to the myth of NATO as a Cold War relic struggling to define its role since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has adapted effectively throughout its history. From integrating West Germany in the 1950s to responding to Soviet missile build-ups of the 1960s and 70s, to the INF debates in the 1980s and the ultimate demise of the Warsaw Pact in the 1990s, NATO has responded to new threats while seizing opportunities to foster stability and security.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been key to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. A round of enlargement began to erase the line Stalin drew across Europe. NATO responded to end murder

in Kosovo. NATO acted to end a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And, NATO has built new patterns of cooperation through a Permanent Joint Council with Russia, NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

As we consider the future of NATO, the words of one of its founders over half a century ago still offer guidance on the road ahead. Speaking in December 1950 following a NAC meeting in Brussels, Dean Acheson observed:

“The attitude which we take is that we and our allies are moving ahead with courage and with determination to build our common strength. We regard dangers as common dangers and we believe that they can and must be met by common strength. We believe that they need our help in order to maintain their security and that we need their help... Therefore, we are taking a policy of going forward with vigor and with determination and with courage. We are rejecting any policy of sitting quivering in a storm cellar waiting for whatever fate others may wish to prepare for us.”

The September 11 attacks made clear that the world is far from safe and secure. Czech President Vaclav Havel, who will host the Prague Summit, observed that September 11 “alerted us to the evil existing in this world. And we still reject the policy of quivering in a storm cellar. In this dangerous world, allies are indispensable if we are to defeat new threats posed by terrorists and hostile states seeking weapons of mass destruction. Those who suggest that NATO is no longer essential ignore the fact that NATO derives its strength from the common purpose of defending our people and our values.”

NATO faces many challenges. The Prague Summit will mark a crucial step in our effort to shape an Alliance for the new century. Our agenda will be threefold:

- ensuring NATO has the new capabilities needed to meet today's threats to our people,
- extending NATO's membership to more of Europe's newer democracies,

- and intensifying NATO's relationship with Russia, Ukraine and other Partners.

New capabilities. New members. New relationships. It is no accident that this new agenda parallels NATO's founding goals as set out in the 1949 Washington Treaty — to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples; live in peace with all peoples and governments; and promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area.

New Capabilities

The required effort to improve NATO's capabilities to meet 21st century threats will build on work done since the end of the Cold War. NATO's strategic concept recognized as early as 1991 that "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage."

The 1999 Strategic Concept reiterated this recognition, noting that "new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming clearer — oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism."

The growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO and must be addressed. NATO allies need flexible, sustainable forces, able to move long distances in a hurry and deliver overwhelming firepower on arrival. Today, the United States has the vast preponderance of such forces. Other allies, by comparison, have only limited capabilities in critical areas such as lift, precision weapons, intelligence and surveillance platforms, and protection of forces against biological and chemical agents. NATO Secretary General Robertson is committed to bridging the gap between the U.S. and European allies, and will make this a centerpiece of the Prague Summit. We welcome these initiatives and will continue to urge allies to refocus their defense efforts, if need be by pooling their resources to do collectively what they are unable to do individually.

If our allies are serious about bridging this gap, however, they must be prepared to do much more to improve their capabilities."

New Members

Our second goal for Prague is to continue the process of building a united Euro-Atlantic community by extending membership to those democratic European countries who have demonstrated their determination to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; their desire to promote stability; and their resolve to unite their efforts for collective defense.

As President Bush observed last year in Warsaw, "Yalta did not ratify a natural divide, it divided a living civilization." He made it clear that his goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe and to "welcome into Europe's home" every European nation that struggles toward democracy, free markets, and a strong civic culture. The process of enlargement to Europe's new democracies launched in 1997 has fulfilled NATO's promise and brought us closer to completing the vision of NATO's founders of a free and united Europe. But our work is not done.

The president affirmed his belief in NATO membership for "all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings." In his first meeting with allies last June, the president secured a consensus to take concrete, historic decisions at Prague to advance enlargement. He made clear to allies and aspirants his belief that NATO "should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

Since the president spoke, we have been working closely with allies and the nine current aspirant countries to strengthen their preparations so that the aspirants who may be asked to join will add to NATO's strength and vitality. Today, a team led by U.S. Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns is completing a series of visits to all nine current aspirant countries to reinforce the importance of addressing key reform priorities in the months before

Prague. We look forward in the months ahead to a close and continuing dialogue with the members of this Committee and others as we approach these historic decisions. You have great responsibility on this question. It is our goal and expectation that, working with you, we will be able to forge a solid and united approach to enlargement and build an equally strong consensus within the Alliance.

Some have asked in the aftermath of September 11 whether enlargement should remain a priority. The president's answer is "yes." The events of September 11 have reinforced the importance of even closer cooperation and integration between the United States and all the democracies of Europe. If we are to meet new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values and are able to act effectively with us. With freedom under attack, we must demonstrate our resolve to do as much as we can to advance its cause.

Members of this Committee will rightly ask what capabilities and contributions potential new members will bring to the Alliance. The Washington Treaty makes clear that states invited to join NATO should be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is the standard that we and our allies will apply as we approach decisions at Prague. All nine aspirants know that NATO involves serious commitments and solemn responsibilities. Many have already demonstrated their determination to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. The Vilnius Group, meeting in Sofia last October declared their shared intention to "fully support the war against terrorism" and to "act as allies of the United States." Individually, aspirants have responded as de facto allies offering overflight rights, transit and basing privileges, military and police forces, medical units and transport support to U.S. efforts. Most will participate in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Prior to September 11, most aspirant countries had contributed actively to NATO efforts to prevent further hostilities in the Balkans.

We believe that NATO enlargement is a means of achieving NATO's core purposes, and will contribute to NATO's continuing dynamism as the core security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. Enlargement will also widen the circle of democracies and expand the zone of stability and security through the Baltics and the Balkans. Not to embrace countries that have overcome years of communist dictatorship and have proven their ability and willingness to contribute to our common security would be to abandon the very principles that have been NATO's source of strength and vitality. We look forward to the closest consultations with the Congress on this subject, and if NATO does offer new invitations, to the debate in the Senate on that proposition.

New Relationships

Our third goal for Prague is also aimed at advancing NATO's core principles — those of living in peace with all peoples and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the vision of a united Europe from which, Winston Churchill once observed, "no nation should be permanently outcast," we must continue to reach out and expand cooperation and integration with all of NATO's Partners.

NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of September 11. President Bush's vision is of a Russia "fully reformed, fully democratic, and closely bound to the rest of Europe," which is able to build partnerships with Europe's great institutions, including NATO.

At the most recent ministerial meetings in Brussels, allies agreed to create a new NATO-Russia body — the NATO-Russia Council — that will facilitate joint decisions and actions in areas of common concern between NATO and Russia. We have been working intensively with allies in Brussels to develop this new body, which we expect to have in place by the time of the Reykjavik NATO ministerial this May.

This so-called "at 20" relationship will offer Russia the opportunity to participate in shaping the

development of cooperative mechanisms in areas that the Alliance chooses, such as counter-terrorism, civil emergency preparedness, airspace management, and joint training and exercises. “At 20” will not give Russia the ability to veto NATO actions in any areas. It is not a back door to NATO membership. Nor will it infringe on NATO prerogatives. NATO members will continue to take any decision by consensus on any issue. The NATO-Russia Council will be fully separate from the NAC, which will continue to meet and make decisions as it always has on the full range of issues on NATO’s agenda.

While forging new links with Russia, our cooperative vision for NATO embraces all of NATO’s Partners, including Ukraine, countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In fact, NATO is the only institution that can unite the continent in security cooperation, and remains the nexus for broadening and deepening Euro-Atlantic security.

We are particularly determined to focus NATO’s Partner activities on countries of Central Asia that have played such constructive roles in the war against terrorism. The Partnership for Peace and EAPC have been successful vehicles for integration, but we believe that much more can be done to expand cooperation between NATO and these countries.

Nearly 53 years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the United States commitment to Europe and the bedrock of our security and stability in a still dangerous world. Secretary Powell made this point best in his confirmation hearings when he observed that “the value of NATO can be seen by the fact that 10 years after the Cold War, nations are still seeking to join the Alliance, not to leave it.” NATO can meet new threats, building cooperation with former enemies, and ensuring stability in Southeast Europe, giving time for this region to become a part of the European mainstream. NATO’s fundamentals — its shared values, and common commitment to defend freedom — remain sound.

President Bush has a profound respect for NATO’s achievements and a determination to strengthen it for the future. We and our allies have much work ahead, but also an historic opportunity to achieve our goals of defending, integrating, and stabilizing the Euro-Atlantic area and continuing to strengthen this greatest of Alliances. A Europe whole, free and at peace is a goal fast becoming a reality. As we look to Prague and our agenda of new capabilities, new members, and new relationships, we look forward to working closely with the members of... [Congress] ...to ensure that NATO will meet the challenges of today and tomorrow as successfully as it has those of the past. ●

TRANSFORMING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

By Alexander R. Vershbow

U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation



“September 11 delivered a central lesson — not just to Americans but also to Russia and our NATO partners — that we all need our friends and allies more than ever in an increasingly dangerous world,” says Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation and a former U.S. ambassador to NATO. “Today I believe we are witnessing a dramatic redefinition of the relationship between the West and Russia, based on a recognition of our common security interests and our shared commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law.”

The past dozen years have been extraordinary ones for the development of democracy, human rights, economic liberty, and free markets around the world. But the events of September 11 remind us that not everyone shares our belief in or commitment to these values. We were reminded on September 11 that the values and principles we live by are also ones that we may be called on to shed blood to defend.

A new set of dangers today — among them extremism and global terrorism — imperils our future as democratic nations. There is no question that we have underestimated the magnitude of these new challenges for our generation — perhaps because, after the end of the Cold War, the world seemed — and indeed was — a vastly safer place than it had been for a very long time.

For Americans and, I believe, for the rest of the world, the terrorist attacks against the centers of U.S. financial and military power and the deliberate murder of thousands of innocent civilians changed all that.

September 11 delivered a central lesson — not just to Americans but also to Russia and our NATO partners — that we all need our friends and allies more than ever in an increasingly dangerous world.

Today I believe we are witnessing a dramatic redefinition of the relationship between the West and Russia, based on a recognition of our common security interests and our shared commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law.

Much has been written about the close personal relationships that [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin has established with Western leaders such as President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The new relations between the West and Russia that I am referring to, however, are not simply a matter of personal chemistry among world leaders, but an appreciation of the fact that the future of every nation in the European-Atlantic community is intertwined with that of every other. This fact has certainly been driven home to us by the events of the past several months.

Indeed, as we begin the 21st century, it is clear that all of our countries — in North America and across Europe — face similar challenges to their security. These include transnational threats such as global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as continued dangers flowing from regional instability, militant nationalism, and “failed states.” All of us, and all of the multinational institutions on which we rely, must continue to adapt to meet these threats.

The NATO Alliance transformed itself over the past decade — taking on new missions and new members, and developing a range of tools for extending security and stability through cooperation and partnership in the political and military spheres. But September 11 was a reminder that NATO will need to continue to redefine its mission to cope more effectively with new threats, and — even more importantly — that the Alliance must equip itself

with the capabilities needed to fulfill that mission. NATO must also continue the complex effort to forge cooperative links with the European Union, given the EU's growing role in foreign and security policy and its comparative advantages over NATO in some areas. But all the allies recognize that NATO's efforts to deal effectively with 21st century threats will be far more successful if they are accompanied by closer cooperation with Russia.

Many observers have referred to the September 11 terrorist attacks as a turning point in the nature of relations between the West and Russia. But I believe that even before September 11, President Putin had made a strategic choice: he had decided that Russia's future security, economic growth, and political influence could best be assured through closer relations with Europe and the United States, rather than through the competitive, confrontational approach of the Soviet past.

I think that it is more useful to see the September 11 attacks as lending urgency to efforts by the West and Russia to build a stronger, more solid partnership. In the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship, Russia's valuable support for the anti-terror coalition was accompanied by an acceleration of work on a broad range of issues: deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, developing a new strategic framework to deal with new threats, efforts to expand our economic and commercial relations and accelerate Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, and expanded cooperation on many political and regional issues.

The strategic choice by President Putin to join the anti-terrorist coalition has had a dramatic effect on Western views of Russia. His decision made clear that the United States and other Western democracies could work with Russia not just on the basis of tactical necessity, but by following what President Putin has called the "logic of common interests."

Russia's relations with NATO should also reflect this logic of common interests. NATO and Russia have had some success in their first efforts at cooperation over the past decade, especially through our joint peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. But I think that both sides would agree that our cooperation has not fully lived up to the promise embodied in the NATO-

Russia Founding Act signed in 1997. Our common task is to get the relationship right this time: to devise new mechanisms for cooperation, coordinated action, and joint decisions that can integrate Russia more closely in NATO's work, while respecting NATO's and Russia's prerogatives to act alone if necessary.

The idea discussed between Presidents Bush and Putin at their Summit meeting last November, and endorsed by NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers a month later, is quite simple: to create a new forum in which NATO's 19 members and Russia work together as a group of 20 equal partners on issues where our shared interests make it sensible to do so. Areas for joint action "at 20" might include counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, or responding to future regional conflicts. They might also include concrete projects that build a climate of cooperation and transparency between NATO and Russia — politically and militarily.

We hope that the proposed new mechanism will be operational before the May meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik and before President Bush's visit to Moscow and St. Petersburg. It will be a qualitative step beyond today's 19-plus-one format, in which NATO always formulates its position before engaging with its Russian partners. The concept now will be to formulate positions on specific issues and projects through early engagement of the 20 nations meeting together.

This NATO-Russia Council "at 20" can potentially lead to a fundamental and historic change in NATO's dealings with Russia — a move toward a more substantial partnership and genuine collaboration. Of course, it is not back-door membership nor does it mean a veto for Russia over NATO's own decisions. A better metaphor would be to view it as an "alliance with the Alliance" — a joint venture between two powerful, independent entities in areas of mutual interest. While working more closely together, NATO and Russia will maintain their prerogative of independent decision and action. It is, however, our hope that — through concrete joint projects, joint discussions, and eventually even joint decisions — NATO and Russia will more and more be able to take responsibility together for dealing with some of the new challenges to security that threaten peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

For it to work, Russian diplomacy will need to acquire the spirit of flexibility and compromise that is essential to reaching a consensus among nations with differing security perspectives and priorities. This is the way NATO works, but it has not always been a hallmark of Russia's approach to NATO in the past. Put simply, Russia still needs to overcome a legacy of mistrust and competition in its dealings with NATO. For its part, NATO needs to be more open and more flexible in taking Russia's views into account. What is crucial is that we get beyond the zero-sum relationship of the past and develop what we Americans like to call a win-win relationship.

The current war against international terrorism provides an obvious area in which we can put this new cooperative relationship to work. NATO and Russia must work together with other nations to counter terrorists who respect no national boundaries or alliances, and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction that could give terrorists — or states that support them — an even greater capacity to attack our societies.

NATO and Russia are already working on a range of initiatives in the area of counter-terrorism, including the regular exchange of information and in-depth consultations on issues related to terrorist threats, civil-emergency planning, and the role of the military in combating terrorism. In the future, we hope that NATO and Russia can work on a common intelligence assessment of terrorist threats, and develop programs that enable NATO and Russian military forces to operate together in counter-terrorist operations.

Missile defense is another potentially fruitful area for NATO-Russia cooperation. All of our nations must face the fact that efforts to prevent the proliferation of technology for ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have not been fully successful. NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense would be a way to deprive rogue states of the ability to attack or blackmail us with long-range missiles equipped with WMD capable of attacking our cities or our deployed forces. This could include joint early warning, joint

exercises, and even joint industrial development of missile defense systems.

Counter-terrorism and missile defense are just two examples of ways NATO and Russia can cooperate in support of our common interests. If our joint efforts are successful, NATO-Russia cooperation can become one of the central pillars of the global security system of the 21st century.

A stronger NATO-Russia partnership would complement NATO's other efforts over the past decade to extend security and stability across the entire Euro-Atlantic area through cooperation and integration in the political and military spheres. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were important initiatives to this end, as was NATO's admission of new democracies willing to assume the full responsibilities of membership. We hope that a new spirit of cooperation "at 20" will help complete the historic process of Russia's full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Russia and NATO — working together as close partners with other freedom-loving nations of the world — have the opportunity to make the decades ahead an era of peace and progress. This does not mean that there will not be problems that will test our relationship. There is continued concern, for instance, about the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya and recent steps that threaten the future of independent mass media in Russia.

Nevertheless, I believe there is a solid foundation for a new relationship between Russia and NATO. Our cooperation against terrorism and the ongoing talks about new areas of collaboration have created a dynamic in which we can seriously begin to think about Russia and NATO as allies in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. Our common challenge is to make this "alliance with the Alliance" a reality. ●

NATO TRANSFORMATION: SECURING FREEDOM FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

By Douglas J. Feith

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy



“NATO’s core mission remains, as it should, the collective defense of its members, as stated in Article 5. But NATO will continue to adapt to deal with new threats and to capitalize on its strengths in the current era. The Prague Summit — NATO’s first in the new millennium — is scheduled for November of this year. At that Summit, the United States hopes to accelerate NATO’s transformation, stressing three themes: new members, new capabilities, and new relationships,” says Under Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith. This article was adapted from testimony he presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee February 28th.

As happens from time to time, especially since the West’s victory in the Cold War, questions arise about NATO’s relevance. Such questions are useful. We shouldn’t take large institutions for granted. It is salutary to review the Alliance’s rationale and examine its institutions.

Today, we perform this review in light of the lessons of September 11th: lessons about key vulnerabilities of our country despite our conventional military power; lessons about new types of threats; lessons about the global nature of our military responsibilities; lessons about surprise, unpredictability and the necessity for the U.S. military to be adaptable and flexible; and lessons about the value of our community of allies and friends around the world.

In his statement to NATO defense ministers last June, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld listed terrorism first among the types of new threats facing the Alliance. The others he mentioned were cyber-attack, high-tech conventional weapons; and ballistic and cruise missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. Three months later, on September 11th, the first of these anticipated threats materialized with awful impact in New York and Washington.

NATO and our NATO allies responded to the September 11 attack quickly, loyally and usefully. NATO showed it can adapt and respond to unforeseen challenges.

Less than 24 hours after the terrorists’ attack against America, our NATO allies invoked, for the first time in history, Article 5 — the collective defense provision — of the 1949 NATO Treaty. Soon thereafter, NATO took a series of steps to assist us in the war against terrorism. For example, seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft are now patrolling U.S. skies, relieving us of a significant burden and freeing up the U.S. AWACS fleet for important work abroad. Individual NATO allies and Partners are contributing to the war effort and to the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in Afghanistan. Some of the allies’ contributions have come through formal alliance structures and some outside those structures. All those contributions, however, should be appreciated as the fruit of more than 50 years of joint planning, training and operations within the NATO Alliance.

NATO’s core mission remains, as it should, the collective defense of its members, as stated in Article 5. But NATO will continue to adapt to deal with new threats and to capitalize on its strengths in the current era. The Prague Summit — NATO’s first in the new millennium — is scheduled for November of this year. At that Summit, the United States hopes to accelerate NATO’s transformation, stressing three themes: new members, new capabilities, and new relationships.

ENLARGEMENT

President Bush has reaffirmed the U.S. aspiration to promote a Europe “whole and free.” In Warsaw last June, he declared: “I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings ... As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.”

We recognize that enlargement of the Alliance is not an exercise free of risks and difficult judgments. People of experience and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the Alliance excessively unwieldy. They do not want the Alliance to dilute its military capabilities through expansion and they are concerned about NATO’s relations with important neighbors. They want to ensure that any enlargement will strengthen NATO’s ability to perform its essential defense mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new members to the Alliance’s principles and work will be enduring and fulfillable.

These are prudent cautionary considerations and they are informing the administration’s enlargement strategy. We think NATO can enlarge — indeed should — in ways that will serve the national security interests of the United States and our current allies. A Europe united on the basis of democratic principles, the rule of law, respect for individual rights and the other tenets of the Alliance will be better able to resist and defeat terrorist threats and other threats. The U.S. government believes that an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint defense and operational planning, promotes interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises will be a more effective partner in answering global security challenges.

The aspirant countries have made impressive contributions to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, seven of the nine NATO aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and eight of the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia. They have also shown much-appreciated solidarity with the United States — through their

contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies to act. For operations in Afghanistan, the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence, over-flight rights, access to bases, and public diplomatic support.

As the administration deliberates on specific candidacies, the Defense Department will be assessing the state of the aspirants’ military structures, their implementation of defense reform, the readiness of military units dedicated to NATO missions, and the military value the aspirant countries can add to NATO.

TRANSFORMATION

The transformation of NATO’s capabilities can and should proceed hand-in-hand with its enlargement. This may be the gravest challenge for the Alliance in the coming years. NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo exposed collective Alliance shortfalls in the capabilities most relevant to modern warfare; they also exposed a disturbing — and growing — capabilities gap between the United States and its allies. We heard encouraging rhetoric at the 1999 Washington Summit, but by-and-large have seen meager results. The widening capabilities gap not only weakens the Alliance’s military potential, it could in time erode NATO’s political solidarity.

In our view, the Alliance needs to focus on a few priorities, including: defending its forces and populations against weapons of mass destruction; doing a better job of getting allies’ forces to the fight; ensuring that Allied forces can communicate easily with one another without fear of eavesdropping or jamming by their adversaries; and improving allies’ contributions to modern, fast-paced, and more precise combat operations.

We cannot transform NATO capabilities overnight, but we cannot afford to settle for “business as usual.” As we encourage allies to spend more on defense, it is even more important that we get them to “spend smarter.” The Joint Strike Fighter Program is a model of cooperation and efficiency involving the United States and several allies.

NEW RELATIONSHIPS

A third goal for the Prague summit is strengthening NATO's relationship with Russia and revitalizing its relations with other Partners.

We are working hard with our allies to enhance the NATO-Russia relationship. The best way to proceed, we think, is to build a record of success on practical projects that benefit everyone involved. We believe that this effort can dissipate vestigial fears in Russia that NATO threatens its security. We also think that fostering engagement with Russia can induce further democratic, market and military reform in that country and contribute to improved Russian relations with its neighbors. In short, we view the NATO-Russia relationship as complementary to our bilateral efforts to establish a new framework of U.S.-Russia relations.

As we build this enhanced relationship, and as the Alliance and Russia work together where we can, it is essential that NATO retain its independent ability to decide and act on important security issues. We are conscious of the importance of protecting Alliance solidarity and effectiveness. The North Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus, on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia

will not have a veto over Alliance decisions. And NATO-Russia cooperation will not be allowed to discourage or marginalize other Partners. We are confident that we can respect these safeguards as we improve NATO's ties to Russia.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a NATO success story, having produced practical cooperation between the Allies and 27 Partners from Europe through Central Asia. We want to maintain and strengthen Partnership programs beyond Prague, especially in ways that increase the Partners' ability to operate with NATO forces in crisis response operations. And we should not be surprised if, following invitations to some number of aspirants at Prague, other Partners step forward to declare interest in NATO membership.

CONCLUSION

For over 50 years, NATO has been a successful alliance, perhaps the most successful alliance in history. This year, we have an opportunity to enlarge and transform NATO to help ensure that future generations of our Euro-Atlantic community — the core of the community of the world's democratic states — are ready and able to secure their freedom. ●

SUCCESSFULLY MANAGING NATO ENLARGEMENT

By General Joseph W. Ralston

Commander-In-Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO



“The steady integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed. While being cognizant of the dollar cost of enlargement, we should keep in mind the potential costs of delaying enlargement. NATO remains relevant and viable in the post-September 11th world, and the aspirant nations offer limited but improving military capabilities and infrastructure to the Alliance,” says General Joseph W. Ralston, Commander-In-Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO. This article was adapted from testimony General Ralston presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee February 28th.

The North Atlantic Treaty established an alliance that has endured over half a century. During its first forty years, NATO manifested the political will and military capability to deter Soviet expansionism, and that deterrence worked. It provided for the rearmament of Germany within a framework acceptable to her wartime foes. It solidly linked, through forward presence and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the security of Western Europe. The stable security environment, combined with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the subsequent growth of Western Europe into our largest trading partner. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the vibrant markets of the Alliance, crumbled and collapsed.

Without a common foe, some commentators argued, NATO would lose its reason for existence, yet the member nations chose to continue their alliance, and to transform and adapt it to new circumstances. Massive, static conventional defenses were reduced and made more mobile. Numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of stability in an uncertain, new world order, and as a bastion of democratic experience. These countries were linked to NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

The end of the Cold War bipolar order unleashed nationalist, ethnic, and religious tensions resulting in widespread outbreaks of violence. NATO’s relevance in the face of these new threats was reaffirmed by its stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European security problem in the Balkans, outside of NATO’s perimeter, confirmed the enduring value of the Alliance. The inclusion of Partner nations in Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the reform of former communist militaries and in the relief of the manpower burden on NATO.

An unexpected dimension of NATO’s security guarantee, and its relevance to U.S. security, came to worldwide attention after September 11th. America’s NATO allies agreed to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering the attack on New York and Washington as an attack against them all. A dramatic manifestation of this support is the deployment of part of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force to patrol America’s skies. Additionally, NATO’s standing naval forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to prevent terrorist movement and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies.

Thousands of allied troops are supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] Theater. Allies, and Partners as well, have granted access to their airspace and facilities. Less visible but equally important is the enhanced information sharing occasioned by the invocation of Article 5, which has provided numerous leads in the global war on terrorism. In sum, the Alliance continues to play an enormously valuable role for the United States.

NATO began with 12 members, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for the accession of further European states. To be invited, members must unanimously agree that a candidate would adhere to the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. The record of the three newest members bears on the desirability of further enlargement.

At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated 10 years would be required for full integration. The integration processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first three years have been largely successful; the new members are fully engaged in the NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their NATO staff positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the forces and resources that NATO is asking of them. Despite the progress to date, we are learning that some long-term efforts, such as development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps or major weapons systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation, before completion.

The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained strong since accession despite domestic economic challenges. For example, the Czech Ministry of Defense was the only ministry to be spared cuts during their recent two year-long recession, and Poland's six-year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 percent of GDP. According to the Secretary of Defense's 2001 report on allied burden sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, respectively, are ranked 6th, 8th, and

11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all three defense budgets will continue to face pressure from competing ministries, clearly the three new members have demonstrated the will to support national defense.

The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, thanks to their similar backgrounds, have proven to be excellent mentors to the current round of NATO aspirants. They are working to extend peace and security eastward. The Poles are particularly active with military-to-military contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with the Slovaks and Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the 2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, expecting to be ready for duty by 2005.

All three nations have made substantial contributions to ongoing operations, particularly in the Balkans. They supported Operation ALLIED FORCE by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO troops and aircraft. Their combined Stabilization Force (SFOR)/Kosovo Force (KFOR) troop contribution has historically averaged nearly 2,000 troops. In response to NATO's April 2000 call for additional reserve forces, the Poles quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned 60-day KFOR rotation lasted more than five months. More recently, the Czechs contributed an additional 120-man contingent to support Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia.

The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have established. We are watching their progress closely, and find significant challenges lie in areas such as developing a viable NCO corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting, and procurement process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment. Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment. Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western-style thinking, leadership, and especially decision-making.

Elected officials in all three countries face competing priorities for resources while their social systems and economies are still in transition. They must carefully prioritize, focus on their long-term goals, and avoid short-term expedient solutions. The key to success is sustained national will; only that can ensure the new member nations continue to progress in NATO integration.

With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost, defensibility, and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil budget from 23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent to 26.2 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget fell from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share the common costs of the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at \$1.5 billion [\$1,500 million] over 10 years, through the military budget and the NSIP. Of those costs, \$1.3 billion [\$1,300 million] is for infrastructure improvements that are to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share of that cost would be approximately \$400 million — or roughly one-fourth over 10 years. The payoff resides partly in having airfields and logistics facilities able to support NATO and U.S. operations and exercises. Readiness also improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces exercising in these countries.

An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the financing of purchases of U.S. equipment and training through Security Assistance. The President's request for FY 03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under \$41 million. These Department of State grant funds support important Department of Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, while providing U.S. access to new member militaries, governments, and bases. Thus, this sum could be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF funds return to the American defense industry in the form of equipment purchases. (IMET funds also return to the U.S. through the purchase of training and education.)

I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other DOD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the upcoming round of enlargement.

We must also consider the potential cost of not enlarging. The aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith toward becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made membership an important part of their public agenda and sought to increase public support for NATO. From a military standpoint, the outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop contributions to ongoing operations and the use of infrastructure and transit rights could be jeopardized.

President Bush has endorsed enlargement in principle, as did the heads of state of the other allies at last June's informal summit. The enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision. A country with a relatively weak military may still be a productive addition to the Alliance for strong political reasons alone. A case could also be made where a country with a strong military may not be a productive addition due to political concerns. There are nevertheless valid military considerations bearing upon suitability for membership.

The nine aspirant nations have made considerable progress under the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) established in 1999. They have agreed to pursue Partnership Goals related to the MAP within the PfP Planning and Review Process. The Partnership Goals integrate lessons learned from the previous round of enlargement and the tenets of the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), providing a roadmap toward reform. NATO has provided the aspirants with feedback on their progress through assessments of both their accomplishment of Partnership Goals and their MAP annual national plans. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has conducted in-country assessments of aspirants' progress at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The aspirants have a common legacy of authoritarian Communist defense planning that was unaccountable

to the public. They have dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy documents in a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main categories: those who inherited a burden of obsolete Warsaw Pact equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those who had to build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania fit clearly into the first category, and Slovakia to a lesser degree, since it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining a disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been stripped bare of all equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of Soviet forces. Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any part of the Yugoslav armed forces upon independence. Aspirants with legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic situation. Aspirants without legacy militaries have struggled to recruit sufficient qualified personnel and acquire a coherent mix of equipment.

Areas of concern to both categories, on which they have made good progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in support of operations, the ability to secure classified information, infrastructure to support NATO deployments, NCO corps development, and quality of life for troops. All are financially constrained in their reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete with other national reform priorities.

ASPIRANT MILITARY CAPABILITIES

As EUCOM's military contribution to the political decision-making process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for admission to NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with an assessment of each aspirant's current military posture. The aspirant countries have worked to develop their military capabilities, based on lessons learned in the previous round of NATO enlargement (Czech Republic,

Poland, and Hungary) and through participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, SFOR, KFOR, PfP, and the MAP. In making our assessment of their progress and current status, EUCOM has focused on four primary areas: strategy and force structure, defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security procedures. Following is a general description of the criteria EUCOM is using to examine the aspirants in each of these four areas.

STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE. Sound national security and military strategy documents, effective interagency resource management, rationalized force structures, personnel management, and English language capability are top-level indicators of military potential. The capstone national strategy documents with public and parliamentary support are at various levels of development and approval, with no obvious stragglers. Planning, programming, and budgeting system-type resource planning is being implemented slowly.

Military force structure is currently being revised to combine immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the first two. In all cases, transition requires painful personnel restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound national military strategy. Personnel management includes accession, knowing what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an effective NCO corps, quality of life, and professional education. These are building blocks of a quality force. Similarly, English language is the foundation of interoperability. All have made excellent progress in training key individuals during the last few years.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. Defense capabilities, aligned according to the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness, and proof of sound planning and budgeting. The bottom line is: can they deploy a reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate with it, protect it, and fight effectively with it? Deployability and Mobility, particularly by air and sea, are generally weak areas for all aspirants. Sustainability and Logistics, to include the nation's ability to support its deployed forces and to support

NATO deployments on its national territory (host nation support, air transport handling, airfield, road, rail, and port infrastructure), vary among the aspirants.

Effective Engagement includes a basic ability to fight, on the offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, weather, terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and training elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant's ability to engage effectively, we closely examine the capabilities of their land, air, and maritime forces. Air forces are expensive, and flying hours have been under-funded, resulting in degraded training. All aspirants have marginally effective air forces. Survivability of Forces and Infrastructure ensures the military can continue to fight once attacked. Survivability and engagement capabilities vary among the aspirants.

Consultation, Command, and Control (a NATO term synonymous with U.S. C4), through reliable and secure communication and information systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces. Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from comprehensive C4 studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF Electronic Systems Center. Most have demonstrated progress in establishing centralized C4 planning. Most aspirants can monitor their airspace, but have limited ability to enforce their airspace sovereignty. The U.S.-funded Regional Airspace Initiative has provided modern Air Sovereignty Operations Centers to all aspirants except Macedonia and Albania.

Wrapping up defense capabilities, EUCOM assessed the aspirants' ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in support of NATO and their ability to sustain, protect, communicate, and fight with that force. NATO considers this size effort to be the lowest common denominator of capability that would be expected of any NATO aspirant.

LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to reinforcement of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment of national forces in support of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession. All have resolved or are in the process of resolving these obstacles.

SECURITY. Another area of interest is the ability to protect classified information. The aspirants have fairly strict traditions regarding classified handling and are making good progress in the establishment of national authorities and policies, investigative clearance-granting services and document registries. Security of communications and information systems is generally weaker than physical and personnel security. Information assurance programs are at varying levels of development and progress.

The military assessments of the aspirants, based on these criteria, continue to be updated. It would be premature at this point to publicly release relative comparisons or rankings.

CONCLUSION

It is important to reaffirm that NATO's overarching objective of opening up the Alliance to new members is to enhance stability in Europe as a whole, more than to expand NATO's military influence or capabilities or to alter the nature of its basic defense posture. Clearly, the aspirants have focused their efforts on areas crucial to the previous NATO enlargement, as identified through the MAP process.

The steady integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed. While being cognizant of the dollar cost of enlargement, we should keep in mind the potential costs of delaying enlargement. NATO remains relevant and viable in the post-September 11th world, and the aspirant nations offer limited but improving military capabilities and infrastructure to the Alliance. ©

IMPROVING NATO'S CAPABILITY: A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR THE PRAGUE SUMMIT

By Carl Levin

Chairman, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee



“Depending upon whom you talk to, NATO’s glass is either half-full or half-empty. Some on both sides of the Atlantic have raised concerns about the future roles and missions of NATO and NATO’s relevance in the post-September 11 world,” says Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat. “But the fact remains that NATO must address a number of crucial issues no later than the November Prague summit.” This article is adapted from remarks by Senator Levin at a committee hearing February 28 on the future of NATO.

In just nine months, NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Prague to make a decision on enlargement of the Alliance and to focus on a number of other crucial areas.

Depending upon whom you talk to, NATO’s glass is either half-full or half-empty. Some on both sides of the Atlantic have raised concerns about the future roles and missions of NATO and NATO’s relevance in the post-September 11 world. Some have even cited NATO’s invocation of Article 5 for the first time in its history, and the numerous offers by NATO members to participate in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as a factor demonstrating NATO’s weakness because the United States has not seen fit to take up most of those offers.

I am reminded of a statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson upon the conclusion of the meeting of NATO’s Heads of State and Government in June of last year that “NATO’s credibility is its capability.” He made that statement to exhort the Alliance’s European members to spend more and more wisely on defense. That exhortation has not borne fruit because Lord Robertson said publicly last month that “the truth is that Europe remains a military pygmy.” To put the issue in some context, the \$48 billion [\$48,000 million] annual increase requested by President Bush for the defense budget, constitutes 150 percent of the total defense spending

of the United Kingdom or France, the next largest NATO member states defense budgets after the United States.

I must admit that I am from the glass is half-full camp. I am a strong supporter of NATO — the most successful Alliance in the history of the world. NATO successfully deterred an attack by the former Soviet Union and, also very importantly, it helped to keep the peace among the nations of Western Europe for five decades.

In recent years, NATO forces fired shots in anger for the first time in its history and brought a negotiated end to the conflict in Bosnia. NATO conducted an air war against Serbian security forces and reversed ethnic cleansing for the first time in history. Even though the United States carried out the bulk of the Kosovo air campaign, I believe it was the moral strength and cohesion of 19 sovereign nations that led to the successful conclusion of the conflict.

At the present time, the Alliance is conducting three peacekeeping operations in the Balkans — in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Macedonia. The Europeans are providing the bulk of the forces for these operations and the overwhelming majority of the civil assistance and financial support for those countries. Pursuant to NATO’s invocation of Article 5 in response to the horrendous terrorist attacks on the United States on


September 11th, NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft were deployed to patrol the skies over America and NATO's Standing Naval Forces were deployed to the eastern Mediterranean at the United States' request.

But the fact remains that NATO must address a number of crucial issues no later than the November Prague summit. Today, we begin our consideration of all of these issues. ●

NATO ENLARGEMENT: WE MUST CAREFULLY REVIEW AND STUDY THE RAMIFICATIONS

By John W. Warner

Ranking Republican, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee



“Should we be considering dramatically expanding what is fundamentally a military alliance at the same time we are trying to define NATO’s future mission and address critical shortfalls in current NATO member’s military capabilities and spending? Should NATO not get its own house in order before considering further expansion,” asks Senator John Warner, a Virginia Republican and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee? This article is adapted from remarks by Senator Warner at a committee hearing February 28 on the future of NATO.

The broad issue before us ... is the future of NATO — in my view, the most valuable security alliance in the history of the United States, if not the world. In light of the events of the past several years, and particularly events since September 11, NATO is now confronted with some fundamental questions about its future:

- What is the future role and mission of NATO in a world where threats to NATO members are now primarily non-state global threats, such as global terrorist organizations?
- Is NATO equipping to meet the asymmetric threat?
- Will NATO be able to operate as an effective military alliance if NATO’s European members continue not making the critical investments in defense that the United States is making?
- Are the other 18 nations in NATO concerned with the technological gap between the United States and their nations and do they plan to address this problem?
- Is bigger better — what are the compelling reasons to expand?

Let me quote from NATO Secretary General Robertson’s recent speech on NATO’s future at the recent Wehrkunde Conference in Munich:

“The United States must have partners who can contribute their fair share to operations which benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic community ... But the reality is ... hardly any European country can deploy useable and effective forces in significant numbers outside their borders, and sustain them for months or even years as we all need to do today. For all Europe’s rhetoric, and annual investment of over \$140 billion [\$140,000 million] by NATO’s European members, we still need U.S. help to move, command, and provision a major operation. American critics of Europe’s military incapability are right. So, if we are to ensure that the United States moves neither towards unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities.”

Against this backdrop of questions on NATO’s future is the issue of the further enlargement of NATO — which will be a main focus of the Prague Summit in November. Currently nine nations are under consideration for NATO membership. My question is this: should we be considering dramatically expanding what is fundamentally a military alliance at the same time we are trying to define NATO’s future mission and address critical shortfalls in current NATO member’s military capabilities and spending? Should NATO not get its own house in order before considering further expansion? My concerns with NATO expansion have not changed substantially since the full Senate last debated this

issue in 1998. If anything, the problems revealed by the Kosovo operation in 1999 have increased my apprehension about future rounds of NATO enlargement.

I start from the basic premise that NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. That is why NATO was founded; that is why it continues today. Nations should be invited to join NATO only if there is a compelling military rationale for additional members, and only if those additional members will make a positive military contribution to the Alliance. In my view, that case has yet to be made for the nine nations currently seeking NATO membership.

We must always keep in mind that any country joining NATO will be extended the protection of Article 5 of the NATO Charter which states, “An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” That article was invoked for the first time following the attacks on the United States on September 11.

This security guarantee is the most solemn commitment any nation can make. Are the American people willing to risk U.S. military troops and expend taxpayers’ dollars to defend the nine additional nations seeking NATO membership? This will be a hard sell, given the declining defense budgets of our current NATO allies and the meager military contributions that could be made by the nine aspirant countries.

If NATO expands beyond its current 19 members, some fear that the Alliance may become increasingly inefficient and indecisive — a mini-United Nations for Europe. We witnessed some of the problems involved in operating by consensus during the Kosovo air operation. So the question is, will the addition of up to nine new member states — for a total of 28 nations — make that problem potentially unmanageable from a military perspective?

NATO is an alliance that has worked well for over 50 years, beyond the expectations of its founding fathers. Before we make a decision to enlarge the Alliance further, we need to carefully review and study all possible ramifications of expansion. We begin that process today. ●

NATO'S FUTURE

*By Lord Robertson
NATO Secretary General*



“NATO must continue to evolve. The context for our security is changing, and everybody in the security business has to adapt. What people do not seem to know is that we are already on the job. We have a clear mission, set down at our autumn ministerial meetings, to make November’s Prague summit a focus for adaptation and change,” says NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. His remarks are adapted from a speech given February 3 at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.

Today, the most serious security issue facing us all is the campaign against terrorism. At ground zero and elsewhere in New York I was told repeatedly that NATO’s response to September 11 had reaffirmed the importance of the transatlantic partnership.

But we have all seen that a succession of commentators have started to argue that NATO has been marginalized and that its future is in doubt.

This is not the first time that predictions of this kind have been made. When the Berlin Wall fell, some critics suggested that NATO had completed its mission, and could pack it in. Then, after the success of the Gulf War coalition, they suggested that all future operations would be exactly like Desert Storm — and that, as a result, NATO wasn’t needed to meet modern challenges.

The critics were wrong. During the 1990s, NATO’s members transformed the Alliance to deal with instability in Southeast Europe, to provide security across the European continent and to spearhead the modernization of their armed forces.

NATO prospered, expanded and even won its first military campaign, in Kosovo. Kosovo was, by any standards, a huge success. We won in 78 days, with minimum casualties and none on the Allies side, without a legacy of bitterness or terror, and with all our objectives met.

Every time I visit Kosovo, I meet people who would not be alive today but for NATO’s planes and soldiers. You don’t hear them bleating about “war by committee.”

Today, NATO is keeping the peace in trouble spots in Southeast Europe; and cooperating more and more deeply with Russia, Ukraine, and 25 other countries in Europe and Central Asia. And as a sign of NATO’s popularity, nine countries are queuing to join this year.

Make no mistake, in 2002, there is simply no credible alternative forum to NATO for transatlantic security coordination. Nor is there any credible alternative for ensuring the military and political interoperability on which all coalition operations depend.

There is no other means than NATO to ensure that European defense strengthens our collective capacity. And there is no other organization which can provide stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and prevent the danger of re-nationalizing defense in Europe.

But September 11th changed the world. As a result, some critics now argue that NATO has no role in dealing with the new threats that confront us all. Or that it could have a role but lacks the political will to seize it.

I totally disagree. The critics were wrong after the Cold War and the Gulf War. They are wrong now.

NATO is not only a part of the campaign against terrorism — it is an essential part.

Start with the declaration of Article 5. We must not let revisionists cast doubt on the fundamental importance of that decision. By declaring that this attack was an attack against them all, NATO's 19 members triggered the same collective defense arrangements for the United States which Europeans had counted on during the Cold War.

This decision demonstrated that the mutual trust and commitments on which the Alliance has been based for 52 years remain tangible, real and reciprocal.

But Article 5 is not just a statement of solidarity. It is also a commitment by allies to offer practical support and it was a unique signal to the world of terrorism that they had crossed a serious threshold with their attack.

At the outset of the crisis, the United States was quickly granted a range of specific measures, such as enhanced intelligence support; blanket overflight rights, access to ports and airfields, and so on.

Most significant, of course, was the move of seven NATO AWACS aircraft across the Atlantic to patrol U.S. airspace.

As President Bush said in his joint press conference with me in the White House Rose Garden on October 10: "This has never happened before, that NATO has come to help defend our country, but it happened in this time of need and for that we are grateful." A high point indeed in the transatlantic relationship.

It is true that NATO did not lead the campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaida because, as in the case of Desert Storm in the Gulf, a larger, more diverse coalition was needed for that phase of the attack on terrorism. But NATO's political, military and logistic support has nonetheless been crucial.

Furthermore, European members are leading the international stability force now deploying to Kabul. As in Desert Storm, their ability to work effectively with each other and with the United States is the result of decades of cooperation in NATO.

It is a striking fact that because of NATO's emphasis on multinational interoperability, British tanker aircraft over Afghanistan can refuel U.S. Navy fighters, but U.S. Air Force tankers cannot. Without a core of practical interoperability, we would rapidly be forced to rely on coalitions of the willing but incapable.

And NATO's role stretches even further — because it has made a vital contribution to building the coalition that the United States needs to win this campaign. For years, NATO has been building partnerships and trust with Central Asian partners.

Now these same countries are providing airspace and bases without which effective operations in Afghanistan would have been impossible. That would not have been feasible without those years of cooperation with NATO.

Afghanistan reinforces the fact that no modern military operation can be undertaken by a single country. Even superpowers need allies and coalitions to provide bases, fuel, airspace and forces. And they need mechanisms and experience to integrate these forces into a single coherent military capability.

NATO and its partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are the world's largest permanent coalition. And NATO is preeminently the world's most effective military organization. It will not be in the lead in every crisis. But it has a vital role — in my view the vital role — to play in multinational crisis prevention and crisis management.

Nonetheless, to maintain that role, NATO must continue to evolve. The context for our security is changing, and everybody in the security business has to adapt. What people do not seem to know is that we are already on the job.

We have a clear mission, set down at our autumn ministerial meetings, to make November's Prague summit a focus for adaptation and change. Thus the Alliance is becoming the primary means for developing the role of armed forces to defeat the terrorist threat. NATO forces have already destroyed dangerous Al-Qaida cells in the Balkans.

Now our nations are examining ways to improve our forces' abilities to protect themselves against the use of weapons of mass destruction. And we are looking at using the military's unique skills and capabilities more effectively to protect our populations, and to assist in civil emergencies.

We are engaging non-NATO countries, including Russia, in the process.

This is an important symbol of NATO's deepening relationship with Russia, built on more issues than terrorism. We intend to work together as equal partners, in new ways which benefit both sides but still safeguard NATO's cohesion and the autonomy of action of both sides. If we succeed, and I am confident that we will, the strategic picture will be transformed as fundamentally for the good as it was for evil on September 11th.

We are also redoubling our efforts to complete the modernization of European and Canadian forces. They must be able to take on a greater share of the burden of maintaining our common security — including dealing quickly with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The United States must have partners who can contribute their fair share to operations which benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic community. This is the best possible way to build on the emotional and practical strengthening of transatlantic bonds caused by the terrible attacks last year.

But the picture on burden sharing, is frankly a very mixed one. In practical terms, America's Allies are pulling their weight. In the Balkans, for example, more than 85 percent of the peacekeeping troops are European. The European Union is paying the lion's share in reconstruction and development. Javier Solana and I have a polished political EU-NATO double-act to keep the peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹. And in the coming months, we will see increasing efforts by the Europeans to reduce the burden on American shoulders in some of these Balkan operations.

Unfortunately, the longer term picture is less optimistic. For all the political energy expended in NATO and in the EU, the truth is that Europe remains militarily undersized.

Orders of battle and headquarters wiring diagrams read impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tanks and aircraft give a similar impression of military power. But the reality is that we are hard pressed to maintain those 50,000 European troops in the Balkans. And hardly any European country can deploy useable and effective forces in significant numbers outside their borders, and sustain them for months or even years as we all need to do today.

For all Europe's rhetoric, and an annual investment of over \$140 billion [\$140,000 million] by NATO's European members, we still need U.S. help to move, command and provision a major operation.

American critics of Europe's military incapability are right. So, if we are to ensure that the United States moves neither toward unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities.

I am therefore redoubling my clarion call of "capabilities, capabilities, capabilities." This will not make me popular in some capitals. I hope it will, nonetheless, be listened to, especially by Finance Ministers.

Yet the United States must do much more too. Not in terms of soldiers on the ground or aircraft in the air. But in facilitating the process of European defense modernization. By easing unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial cooperation, Washington can improve the quality of the capabilities available, and diminish any problems our forces have in working together.

If the U.S. does not act in this way, the huge additional investment it is making in defense will make practical interoperability with allies, in NATO or in coalitions, impossible. The gap between American forces on the one hand and European and Canadian forces on the other will be unbridgeable.

For Washington, the choice could become: act alone or not at all, and that is no choice at all.

Finally, we are beginning the modernization of NATO's decision-making processes. NATO has a unique ability to take and implement quick decisions. We showed it last summer, when within five days of the political decision we deployed 4,000 troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to supervise a crucial disarmament process, and help prevent a civil war.

That kind of quick action will be necessary in future — including, potentially, to respond to terrorism. We must therefore ensure that it can still be done after any NATO enlargement in November.

I welcome a renewed debate on NATO's future. The Alliance has a proud record and the proven ability to adapt as risks change.

In an uncertain world, NATO is not an optional extra. It is the embodiment of the transatlantic bond, the fundamental guarantor of Euro-Atlantic stability and security, and the essential platform for defense cooperation and coalition operations.

As a result the Alliance remains as busy and as relevant to the 21st century as it was to generations in the last one. ●

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.

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PREPARING NATO TO MEET NEW THREATS: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

By Richard L. Kugler

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“The upcoming Prague Summit in November 2002 offers a forum for launching a new era of NATO change and reform. Undeniably, pursuing this weighty agenda will change NATO’s strategic horizons and the transatlantic relationship as well,” says Professor Richard Kugler of National Defense University. “But the new threats make this agenda essential, for otherwise NATO will erode and its members will be left endangered. This imperative defines both the challenge and the opportunity ahead.”

In dealing with the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), NATO is confronted with one of its biggest challenges in many years, but an imperative opportunity, too. As the events of September 11 and the ongoing war on terrorism show, the challenge is to meet dangerous threats that are arising far outside NATO’s borders, but gravely menace the safety and security of both North America and Europe. The opportunity is to reform NATO so that it can better defend against these threats and defeat them. NATO has begun pursuing this agenda, but thus far, critics portray its response as shaky and incomplete. Whether NATO will react decisively remains to be seen, but one thing can be said: Throughout its long history, NATO has flourished as the world’s best alliance of democracies because it has always risen to the occasion and changed with the times. For the good of all members, it needs to do so again.

THE NEW THREATS OF A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Make no mistake, modern-day terrorism and WMD proliferation are “Article 5 threats” in NATO’s parlance. So-called “Article 4 threats” are directed only against common interests outside NATO’s borders: ethnic warfare in the Balkans is a good example. By contrast, the new threats are capable of violating NATO’s borders and striking the societies of all its members as well as their military forces: the time-honored definition of Article 5 threats that activate NATO’s collective defense pledge. Unlike

terrorism of the past, moreover, the new threats are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage. The terrorist strikes on the United States on September 11 killed over 3,000 innocent people from many countries — more than the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Future attacks are not only possible but seem likely. Yet these threats seem small in comparison to the greater damage that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons could inflict if they are unleashed. Today the United States lives under siege. Can Europe be far behind?

Why are these threats emerging? The direct answer is the evil intentions of perpetrators who are willing to inflict massive destruction on their victims, NATO members and other countries as well. But the full reasons are wider and more deep-seated. The new geopolitics is one reason: new forms of rivalry among nation-states and political ideologies that transnational groups, such as terrorists, are joining. Another cause is globalization, the accelerating cross-border flow of trade, finances, technology, and communications that is drawing once-distant regions closer together, creating webs of interdependent ties. Earlier, globalization was seen as uniformly positive because it offered to bring economic growth and democracy to all corners of the world. But more recently, globalization has emerged as hydra-headed, for it also strains regions unprepared for the information era, modernization, and stiff competition in global markets. Globalization is producing a bifurcated world. Yes, it is making the already-prosperous democracies even wealthier, while

helping others make progress. But elsewhere, it is nurturing venomous anti-western ideologies and deeply angry actors — nihilistic terrorists and menacing countries bent on acquiring WMD systems — that are willing to lash out against the western democracies and others that they blame for their fate.

These new threats are merging together in ways that reinforce each other. They also are gaining access to the modern information systems and technologies that allow them to inflict violence at very long distances, from one continent to the next. Beyond this, these threats are bringing further chaos and turmoil to the vast southern arc of instability, stretching from the Middle East to the Asian littoral, along which most of them reside. This trend is rapidly making NATO's old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 obsolete. While the new threats are arising in regions well outside Europe, they menace NATO's strategic interests, its democratic values, and its physical safety at the same time.

CRAFTING A POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE

As U.S. policy recognizes, the western democracies must mount a strong political and strategic response to growing dangers that, if left unchecked, could cause the early 21st century to go up in smoke. Clearly, this response must aspire to bring better governance, market economies, and modernizing societies to poverty-stricken regions along the southern arc and elsewhere, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Just as clearly, this response must also aspire to defeat the twin threats of global terrorism and WMD proliferation. The United States and its European allies must defend themselves against these serious threats. In addition, these threats must first be quelled if long-term efforts to bring progress to troubled regions are to succeed. In today's world, the pursuit of security and progress must go hand-in-hand. Indeed, the former is a precondition for the latter.

The United States will lead the response in the security arena, but it cannot carry the weight alone, nor should it be expected to do so. As Europe's premier security institution, NATO is the natural vehicle for helping prepare Europe's contribution, organize it, and harmonize it with U.S. efforts. In the

aftermath of September 11, NATO rose to the occasion by declaring global terrorism an Article 5 threat. It sent AWACS aircraft to help defend the U.S. skies, assigned naval forces to patrol the eastern Mediterranean, increased intelligence sharing, initiated an inventory of national civil emergency resources, and bolstered multilateral coordination of law-enforcement measures aimed at rooting out terrorist cells. When U.S. forces launched combat operations in Afghanistan, British forces joined them, and other European countries offered to help. Later, several European countries, including Germany and France, sent troops to lead multinational peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and their special forces took part in Operation Anaconda against lingering al-Qaida strongholds.

Now that the United States is widening the war on terrorism to other regions and preparing to confront such WMD proliferators as Iraq, the situation calls for the Europeans and NATO to launch additional efforts in support. While the United States must not act unilaterally when multilateralism is viable, the Europeans must not sit on the sidelines, criticizing but not helping. Will they respond constructively? Much depends upon Europe's leaders and a healthy transatlantic dialogue. Because a debate is in progress across Europe, critics have their doubts. Yet vigorous debate is nothing new for NATO. In the past, debates have always been the forerunner of a widespread consensus behind strong political and strategic responses that met the requirements of difficult times, including during the Cold War when the dangers were also great and the policy issues equally thorny. Hopefully the past will be prologue.

THE AGENDA AHEAD

NATO's strategic response needs to cover the full spectrum of policy instruments: political, diplomatic, economic, and military. This demanding agenda necessitates that even as NATO enlarges to welcome new members and pursues a close dialogue with Russia, it cannot afford to become a loose collective security pact that lacks military teeth and strategic punch. In addition to bolstering homeland defenses on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO must strengthen its capacity to launch demanding security operations well outside Europe, for it will not be able to cope

with the new threats if it remains a border-defense alliance. NATO should not become a “global alliance,” but it does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisely in other theaters.

A compelling case can be made that NATO should rewrite or amend its current strategic concept, adopted in 1999, in order to establish a consensus for new policies aimed at managing the new threats. Such a consensus should neither ask the Europeans to support U.S. efforts in rote ways nor give them a brake on assertive U.S.-led efforts. Instead, it should establish a common framework for the United States and Europe to act together in energetic, collaborative ways. Harmonizing alternative views requires patient dialogue, but this approach has worked in the past, and it can work again. The United States and some European countries may not always agree on specific actions, but their core interests and goals are compatible in ways that normally will permit common perspectives.

NATO also must ensure that it continues to act as an alliance of equals. As during the Cold War, its future efforts in specific areas may be carried out by coalitions of the committed and able. Sometimes these coalitions may act outside the NATO structure, with NATO in support. But NATO should steer away from any “division of labor” that divides the alliance into separate blocs. This judgment applies to politics and diplomacy, but it especially holds true for military operations. NATO should not expect the United States and Britain to act as “bad cops,” while other members act as “good cops” who pursue peaceful reconciliation with adversaries. Nor should the United States and Britain carry out the intense combat missions, while other NATO members perform peacekeeping in the aftermath. Nor should the United States perform high-tech bombing missions, while other members fight on the ground. A seamless sharing of duties, coupled with a flexible approach to the particulars, is best.

Finally, NATO and the Europeans must improve their military capabilities for missions against the new threats. Today’s European militaries are larger and stronger than is commonly realized, with 2.4 million

active-duty troops and \$150 billion in defense spending. But because they still focus on defending their borders, they lack the capacity to project power to long distances, where the new threats reside. In addition, they are in danger of falling further behind the U.S. military as it transforms itself with new operational doctrines and technologies, including modern information systems, sensors, and munitions. If today’s interoperability gap widens further, European and U.S. forces might not be able to fight together even if Europe’s political leaders do not want to sit on the sidelines and watch.

While a crash defense buildup is not necessary, the Europeans need to configure a portion of their forces for swift power projection and high-tech strike operations with U.S. forces. To help guide this effort, NATO could replace its ongoing “Defense Capabilities Initiative” with a tighter-focused transformation effort aimed at acquiring high-priority capabilities. Initially this effort might create a small European “spearhead force”: a fully networked force composed of about 60,000 ground troops, plus several fighter wings with smart munitions and naval combatants with cruise missiles. Such a posture would be similar in size to the European Union’s force for Petersberg tasks, but its NATO mission would be to complement similar spearhead forces that the new U.S. defense strategy is creating. If the Europeans create such a force, their relevance to the new era will grow faster than critics think possible.

CONCLUSION

The upcoming Prague Summit in November 2002 offers a forum for launching a new era of NATO change and reform. Undeniably, pursuing this weighty agenda will change NATO’s strategic horizons and the transatlantic relationship as well. But the new threats make this agenda essential, for otherwise NATO will erode and its members will be left endangered. This imperative defines both the challenge and the opportunity ahead. ©

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A CHANGING NATO AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

By Philip H. Gordon

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“The Alliance remains the primary vehicle for keeping the United States engaged in European security affairs. Through its enlargement process, it is playing a critical role in unifying a continent that had been divided for almost 50 years,” says Philip H. Gordon of the Brookings Institution. “NATO brought peace to the Balkans, and continues to deploy tens of thousands of troops to the Balkans, without which the region could easily revert to the horrible conflicts of the 1990s.”

Less than 24 hours after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, America’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came together to invoke the Alliance Article 5 defense guarantee — this “attack on one” was to be considered an “attack on all.” When it came time to implement that guarantee, however — in the form of the American-led military campaign in Afghanistan — NATO was not used. The Americans decided not to ask for a NATO operation for both military and political reasons — only the United States had the right sort of equipment to project military forces half-way around the world, and Washington did not want the political interference of 18 allies in the campaign.

In the wake of these decisions, some observers have begun to wonder whether NATO has any enduring role at all. And there are, in fact, serious reasons to be concerned about the future of the Alliance if leaders on both sides of the Atlantic do not take the steps necessary to adapt it to changing circumstances. The Afghanistan campaign revealed significant gaps between the war-fighting capabilities of the United States and its allies, and reinforced the perception in some quarters in Washington that it is easier to conduct operations alone than with allies who have little to offer militarily and who might hamper efficient decision-making. Moreover, the U.S. decision in the wake of the terrorist attacks to increase its defense budget by some \$48 billion [\$48,000 million] for 2003 — an increase larger than any single European country’s entire defense budget

— will only make this capabilities gap worse. To the extent that the war on terrorism leads the United States to undertake military operations in other distant theaters, and to the extent that the Europeans are unwilling or unable to come along, NATO’s centrality will be further diminished.

Yet to conclude that NATO no longer has any important roles to play because it was not used for a mission that it was not designed for would be perverse and mistaken. The Alliance remains the primary vehicle for keeping the United States engaged in European security affairs. Through its enlargement process, it is playing a critical role in unifying a continent that had been divided for almost 50 years. NATO brought peace to the Balkans, and continues to deploy tens of thousands of troops to the Balkans, without which the region could easily revert to the horrible conflicts of the 1990s. Through its Partnership for Peace, the Alliance has reached out to and promoted military cooperation with partners in Central Asia, some of which ended up making essential contributions to the campaign in Afghanistan. NATO also continues to perform the important function of promoting military interoperability among the allies, so that they can cooperate militarily among each other even when NATO per se is not involved — as they did during the 1990-91 Gulf War and in parts of the operation around Afghanistan. In short, while the war on terrorism does indeed suggest that NATO is no longer the central geopolitical institution it was during the Cold War, it would be premature and extremely short-

sighted to conclude its mission is over and that it has no future role to play. Instead of giving up on NATO, the North American and European allies should use its upcoming summit — in Prague in November 2002 — to continue to adapt the Alliance to the most important security challenges of the day. Just as previous developments — such as the end of the Cold War or the conflicts in the Balkans — have obliged the Alliance to adapt, September 11 and the conflict that has followed it will require NATO leaders to think boldly and creatively about how to keep the Alliance relevant.

HOW SHOULD NATO ADAPT AT PRAGUE?

First, Alliance leaders should make clear that new threats such as international terrorism are a central concern to NATO member states and their populations. Already in its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO leaders recognized that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context” and that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”¹ NATO made essentially the same point in the 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of “other risks.”² This is not to say that any act of terrorism or threat to energy supplies can or should be treated as an Article 5 contingency for which all allies are obliged to contribute troops. It does mean, however, that all allies recognize that their common interests and values can be threatened by global developments, a point made dramatically clear by the attacks on Washington and New York. Even if invocations of Article 5 will no longer necessarily mean a formal NATO operation under NATO command, the concept that “an armed attack” from abroad must trigger solidarity among the member states is an important development that must be maintained and reinforced.

Second, NATO members — and particularly the European allies — must accelerate the process of adapting their military capabilities for new missions in light of the new campaign. At NATO’s April 1999 summit, the allies adopted a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) designed to improve allied forces’ deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability,

and effectiveness.³ The DCI process identified some 58 areas in which allies were asked to make concrete improvements in their forces to fill specific gaps in allied capabilities. But the DCI process never really had political visibility and few of its goals have been fulfilled. At Prague, European NATO members should consider whittling down this long list to some 3-5 most critical categories — perhaps Precision Guided Munitions, airlift, security communications, and in-air refueling — and making real commitments to fulfilling their goals. Not only do the Europeans need to make serious improvements in capabilities if they want to join effectively with the United States in the anti-terrorism campaign, but the EU (European Union) process needs to be fully integrated with NATO’s. Otherwise the current problems with interoperability will only get worse. Europeans have had legitimate complaints about not being fully involved in the first stages of the military operations in Afghanistan, but such involvement will only become more difficult in the future if American and European military capabilities continue to diverge.

Third, NATO should continue the process of enlargement, as a means of developing strong allies capable of contributing to common goals and of consolidating the integration of Central and Eastern Europe. The precise number of candidates that should be accepted at Prague will depend in part on how successfully they maintain their political, economic, and military reform processes between now and the summit, but at a minimum NATO should take in all those candidates who have demonstrated that they are now stable democracies committed to the values of other NATO members. The new relationship between Russia and the West that has resulted in part from the common battle against terrorism should help ensure that NATO enlargement — even to the Baltic states — does not undermine relations with Russia.

Fourth, the Prague summit should be used to promote greater cooperation between NATO and Russia. Significant progress is already being made in this regard, as seen in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s apparently new attitude toward NATO enlargement and his agreement with NATO Secretary General George Robertson to set up a new forum to expand NATO-Russia cooperation. In another sharp break

with the recent past, Moscow has also agreed to get NATO's help in restructuring its armed forces, a move long resisted by Russia's conservative defense establishment. This is an area where NATO has much to offer, as can be seen by the help it has provided to other former Soviet bloc states. NATO should seek to build on this new momentum and propose more far-reaching cooperation that could transform Russia's relationship with the West. This cooperation could include exchanges of information on civil defense cooperation (where both sides would have much to learn from each other), cooperation and training among NATO member and Russian special forces, Russian involvement in collaborative armaments programs, and other NATO-Russia joint military exercises. In the wake of the tragedies of September 11, the prospect that Russia could feel that it is part of the West — rather than threatened by it — is an opportunity that should not be missed.

Finally, NATO needs to develop its capacity to deal with the specific issue of terrorism, a process long resisted by European allies who worried about giving the Alliance too great a “global” or “political” role. In fact, there are great limitations on the role NATO can and should play in this area — issues of law enforcement, immigration, financial control, and domestic intelligence are all well beyond NATO's areas of competence and should be handled in other channels, notably those between the United States and the EU (which have in fact been strengthened since September 11). Still, NATO allies can and should share information about nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs; develop civil defense and consequence management planning; develop theater missile defenses; and better coordinate various member-state special forces, whose role in the anti-terrorism campaign will be

critical. The Alliance should even consider a new Force Projection Command, that would be specifically responsible for planning out-of-area operations. During the Cold War, few could have imagined the need for American and European special forces to travel half way around the world and execute coordinated attacks, but that is now a very real requirement. While NATO was not used for the military response to an attack on the United States, it is unfortunately not difficult to imagine a major terrorist attack on a European city for which a NATO response would be appropriate.

Even with all the right reforms, NATO will probably not again become the central defense organization that it was during the Cold War, or even during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. But that does not mean that it does not remain an essential tool with which the United States and its most important allies can coordinate their militaries, promote the unification of Europe, maintain peace in the Balkans, and quite possibly fight major military operations anywhere in the world. The Prague summit should be used to revitalize and adapt a still-essential organization, not to announce its demise. ●

¹. See “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,” *North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991 (Brussels: NATO), para. 12.*

². See “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” *Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, Press Communique NAC-S(99)65 (Brussels: NATO), para. 24.*

³. See *Washington Summit Communique, Press Communique NAC-S(99)64, Brussels, April 24, 1999, para. 11.*

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CASE STUDY: RESULTS OF FIRST ROUND EXPANSION — POLAND'S EXPERIENCE

*By Ambassador Przemyslaw Grudzinski
Polish Ambassador to the United States*



“By joining NATO, Poland became a member of a military alliance, which in an efficient way, provides for its security,” says Polish Ambassador Przemyslaw Grudzinski. “Poland gained security and confidence, which are fundamental for further development. Without effective and credible security guarantees, the transition toward more prosperous and democratic order would have been much more complex and difficult.”

During heated debates about NATO enlargement, cost-benefit analysis were widely used by politicians and experts. On one side they put arguments for enlargement and on the other side the arguments against it. The net result of these calculations led to the expansion of NATO. However, there are still voices, especially now in view of the next round of expansion, saying that the enlargement of NATO carries more damage than benefits. Of course, I disagree with these opinions. By joining NATO, Poland became a member of a military alliance, which in an efficient way, provides for its security. At the political level, I would like to point out just three benefits:

1. Poland gained security and confidence, which are fundamental for further development. Without effective and credible security guarantees, the transition toward more prosperous and democratic order would have been much more complex and difficult.
2. Thanks to its membership, Poland's position in the region is more constructive and stronger. Even before becoming a member of NATO, Poland tried to play such a role. One has to remember that Poland signed treaties of friendship with all its neighbors and actively participated in regional initiatives such as the Visegrad Triangle (including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), which

proved that a commitment to values such as freedom, respect of human rights, and democracy are deeply rooted in Polish society. However, membership in NATO gave Poland access to financial, institutional, and political instruments that allow a more active and concrete promotion of these values.

3. As a member of NATO, Poland has an opportunity to actively participate in shaping the security framework in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is a very difficult and demanding learning process. It requires knowledge that other countries have been acquiring for 40-50 years. Not surprisingly, we have some problems in this area: there are problems to fulfill our military personnel quotas and there are problems in coordinating our efforts in order to pursue what appears to Poland as an important goal for the Alliance (Ukraine). Poland is striving to achieve greater cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. Our ultimate goal is to encourage Kiev's pro-western policy. However, Poland, with its knowledge of Central and Eastern Europe as well as of Russia, with its long and after all not so bad experience of dealing with economic contingencies, social and political underdevelopment, and ethnic and religious minorities, is able to contribute to the better understanding of complex security challenges that the Alliance is now facing.

Let's move to the military level. I just want to briefly mention the following benefits:

First, membership in NATO required an introduction of civil and democratic control over the Armed Forces. As a result of a delicate process of transition, a civilian Ministry of Defense, responsible in front of parliament, was created. In general, more civilian employees entered the Ministry of Defense. General Staff was integrated into the Ministry and subordinated to a civilian minister. Term limits in commanding positions were introduced and Parliament gained control over the defense budget. These were fundamental steps in creating credible, apolitical military forces.

Already the prospect of joining NATO had forced the Polish army to adjust and modernize. This process gained more speed when Poland actually became a full member. The total number of Polish troops was cut from 400,000 to 165,000 at present, with the goal to reach the level of 150,000 troops by the end of 2003. The reduction in size is combined with a shift in the composition of the armed forces. The conscript service is cut from 24 months to 12 months and there is focus on hiring professional soldiers.

I believe, and tragic events of September 11 convinced me even more, that the enlarged NATO gained in credibility and strength. Let's suppose that NATO did not enlarge. Its main goal — defense — would be greatly undermined. First, NATO not only provides stability and security, but also promotes democracy and the rule of law. By enlarging the area of stability and democracy, NATO members simply improve their security environment. One of the most important arguments used by supporters of NATO enlargement was that there are no different levels of defense that basically you are or you are not protected. What they feared most was that countries in Central and Eastern Europe would be kept in a so-called gray zone. Today that seems extremely improbable, but I will argue that the way from a gray zone to a black hole is not very long. Nowadays the challenges to security derive from the failure of a state and its inability to deliver on its economic, political, social, and cultural pledges. Without the anchor of security and stability, and without a credible prospect to join the Western institutions, the transition toward a democratic state based on the rule of law could have ended up totally differently.

Second, democracies do not carry out aggressive foreign policies, and as such NATO provides just political, financial, and military means to deal with the security challenges of its members. What is unique about NATO and what makes it so attractive is that the common commitment of its members, combined with the level of military cooperation, provides a credible deterrent for any rational actor who would ever consider imposing its power on one of the NATO members. When enlargement occurred, nobody suspected that NATO members would have to act in defense of the United States. Poland, together with other members of the Alliance, invoked Article 5 [stating that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all], but also acted promptly on a regional scale by organizing in Warsaw an international conference on combating terrorism.

A military alliance has to be efficient. There was a fear that enlargement would over-extend NATO and dilute its military capabilities. This fear was combined with worries about America's lesser and lesser interest and involvement in European affairs. These worries were justified since they were derived from a fear of destroying an institution that has served transatlantic interests so long and so well. However, I want to stress that the effectiveness of a military alliance depends on shared interests of its members and on military capabilities. Regarding politics, first I just want to repeat that despite the perception of growing divergences in interests among members of NATO, what makes the transatlantic relationship so strong and special is a deeply rooted commitment to the same fundamental values, including freedom, democracy and respect of human rights. We can discuss the difficulties in implementing these values in Central and Eastern European societies with the legacy of the previous regime, but nobody can question the commitment of Poles, Czechs or Hungarians to these values. Sometimes attitudes of new members can appear a bit childish and immature. However, their enthusiasm and their strong belief in the future of NATO can be helpful in overcoming the tide of NATO-skepticism and therefore strengthen the Alliance.

Third, there was a widespread fear that with 19 members the decision-making process would be even more complex, therefore, undermining the

effectiveness of NATO. However, based on three years experience, it does not seem that the additional members have had such a negative impact on the decision-making process. The time needed to reach a consensus is no longer than before the enlargement. Moreover, enlargement gave an impulse to discuss the modalities and necessary changes in the decision-making process. If NATO wants to live up to its promise of an open door policy and remain an effective alliance, it has to address this issue.

Effectiveness depends also on military capabilities. Contrary to the political field, the military gap between the U.S. and the European members of NATO is a real one. This gap existed before the enlargement of NATO and is still there. It requires a refocus and an increase in military spending from all European members of NATO. I can only add that Poland recognizes this challenge and is considering, among other things, the purchase of a multi-role fighter. It will guarantee Poland a high level of interoperability with the U.S. Army and with NATO, which will allow Poland to support and fully participate in missions that the Alliance decides to undertake — both to guarantee security of its members and to enhance security and stability in other areas of the world.

In the ongoing debate about the future of relations between NATO and European Security and Defense Policy, the Polish position is particularly delicate and difficult. Sometimes accused of betraying an organization of which it is not yet a member, Poland simply refuses to make a choice between NATO and the European Union. Poland supports the development of the European defense identity and

considers it a necessary step to enable Europe to play a more decisive and responsible role in shaping international order. However, Poland believes that such a development can and should take place within the NATO framework. This strong belief derives from a conviction that there are vital common transatlantic security interests, as well as shared basic values, that unite the two sides of Atlantic.

And last but not least — relations with Russia. The enlargement of NATO did not particularly enhance the democratization process in Russia. But if we agree on this, so we have to agree that the same enlargement could not and did not undermine the security of Russia. Yet, the enlargement enhanced the security of the former Warsaw Pact members. Through mutual cooperation and the democratic institutional framework, these countries' ability to protect and realize their own interests has increased. I will argue that thanks to enlargement, Poland and Russia are partners and, therefore, the relations between them are good. Russia is a great state; just because of its size and potential, it can shape international order either in a positive or in a negative way. Poland supports practical and concrete forms of cooperation between NATO and Russia that are geared towards promoting stability, security, and respect for basic common values. At the same time, such cooperation cannot undermine the effectiveness and cohesiveness of NATO, which is a guarantee of Polish vital interests. ©

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Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy: NATO

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nato.htm>

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

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Expand NATO 2002

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George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

<http://www.marshallcenter.org/>

Global Beat: NATO Expansion

<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato.html>

Mediterranean Dialogue

<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/med-dia.htm>

NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency

<http://www.nc3a.nato.int/>

NATO Official Homepage

<http://www.nato.int/>

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

<http://www.naa.be/>

The New Atlantic Initiative

<http://www.aei.org/nai/nai.htm>

Partnership for Peace

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm>

Russia-NATO Partnership

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/nato-rus.htm>

SACLANT: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

<http://www.saclant.nato.int/pio/>

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

<http://www.shape.nato.int/>

Ukraine-NATO Partnership

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/nato-ukr.htm>

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/>

U.S. Department of State: International Information Programs: Europe-Eurasia

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<http://www.nato.int/usa/>

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